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Since the 1990s, opioid addiction and its consequences have grown in magnitude across America,
particularly in poor and rural communities. Approximately 115 people die from opioid overdoses
every day, and the crisis is continuing to worsen (Vivolo-Kantor et al., 2018). There have been
countless proposals to address this crisis, ranging from policies and law changes to abuse-deterrent
reformulations of common prescription opioids. One major innovation in this fight was the expansion
of access to Naloxone, a drug that prevents opioid overdoses from becoming fatal.
Initially, only Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and medical personnel were able to adminis-
ter Naloxone. Starting around 2010, however, states began passing laws that granted “third-party”
access to Naloxone, giving people the ability to purchase Naloxone without a prescription in expec-
tation of administering it to an overdose victim. This expansion of third-party access to Naloxone
has had indeterminate e↵ects. Third-party Naloxone access means that those close to opioid users
can prepare to treat them in the case of an overdose, which has the potential to save many lives.
However, it is also possible that people may be riskier with their use of opioids if they know that
their risk of mortality is lowered, a behavior known as moral hazard (Doleac and Mukherjee, 2018).
Naloxone could have both positive and negative impacts on opioid-related mortality rates, so a
growing literature seeks to determine the net e↵ect of expanded Naloxone access on the opioid
epidemic.
A significant yet overlooked factor in the opioid crisis is social capital, which Zoorob and Salemi
(2017) define as “the extent and depth of social trust, norms and networks.” Social capital is sig-
nificant in the context of the opioid crisis because it may influence the capacity of a community
to fight opioid addiction. There is anecdotal evidence of communities that have successfully re-
covered from the opioid crisis by forming networks of support for users and their families, such as
twelve-step programs held daily so that there is no excuse for missing a meeting. By contrast, indi-
viduals in counties su↵ering from pervasive addiction report feeling as if they should cover up the
addiction of their family members, making it more di cult for those a↵ected to receive treatment
(Quinones, 2015). Because recovering from addiction is challenging and complex, the interplay be-
tween Naloxone access, which can initiate recovery, and social capital, which can assist in recovery,
is of interest.
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This paper investigates the e↵ect of expanded Naloxone access and social capital on opioid-
related mortality using Naloxone access law data from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System
(PDAPS), an index of social capital constructed in Rupasingha et al. (2006), and data from the
Center for Disease Control (CDC) on opioid-related mortality rates. Using county fixed e↵ects and
an indicator variable for Naloxone access in a certain year, this paper specifically investigates the
impact of Naloxone access in the short term on opioid use and the interaction between Naloxone
access and social capital. This is the first study of the e↵ects of Naloxone access that focuses
primarily on its e cacy in relation to social capital. I find that third-party Naloxone access is
associated with a slight increase in opioid-related mortality, consistent with the findings of Doleac
and Mukherjee (2018). I find that social capital reduces opioid-related mortality, consistent with
Zoorob and Salemi (2017). Finally, I find that social capital amplifies the negative impacts of moral
hazard on Naloxone access.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 details the relevant background to the opioid crisis,
Naloxone, and social capital. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 introduces the empirical
strategy and Section 4 presents the results and discussion. Section 5 addresses endogeneity concerns
and Section 6 concludes.
1. Background
The United States faces a public health crisis that has grown in magnitude and devastation over
the past twenty years. The crisis continues to worsen, with overdose-related deaths increasing by
27.7% from 2015 to 2016. The opioid crisis has economic costs as well, putting a strain on the
healthcare system, EMS departments and law o cials and causing an estimated economic loss of
over $75 billion each year (Vivolo-Kantor et al., 2018). The consequences of the opioid epidemic are
playing out in labor markets as well. Krueger (2017) finds that the labor force participation rate of
middle–aged men has decreased more in counties with higher opioid prescribing rates, suggesting
that opioid addiction may play a role in declining labor force participation. Case and Deaton (2017)
find the that decreasing life expectancies of white non-Hispanics aged 30 to 34 is due in part to
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increasing “deaths of despair”—accidental or intentional deaths due to alcohol, drugs, or suicide,
many of which could be a↵ected by the opioid crisis.
Figure 1 presents deaths per 10,000 people due to opioid overdoses, where each data point
represents a county. This figure underscores the dramatic increases in deaths due to opioids between
2011 and 2016. It is also important to examine which categories of opioids are driving this trend.
Figure 2 breaks down opioid overdoses into four drug classifications: heroin, a non-prescription
drug derived from opium; other opioids; Methadone, a synthetic opioid used to treat addiction; and
synthetic narcotics, which include fentanyl, oxycodone, and hydrocodone. All four categories of
opioids, particularly heroin and synthetic narcotics, have seen increased rates of deaths per 10,000
people in a county over time. Due to these concerning trends, the opioid crisis was declared a public
health emergency in 2017, and finding a solution to the crisis concerns researchers in fields from
public health and medicine to economics (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2015).
1.1 Possible determinants of the opioid crisis
There are many possible channels through which the opioid crisis has gained strength. Most re-
searchers agree that the lead-up to the crisis began in the 1990s, when doctors began prescribing
opioid painkillers at higher rates, believing manufacturers’ claims that they were not strongly ad-
dictive. However, abuse and diversion of prescription opioids soon made it clear that addiction was
more dangerous than had been conveyed by the pharmaceutical companies. Overprescription of
the highly addictive drugs led many people to turn to non-prescription opioids such as heroin once
they no longer had access to prescription painkillers. Yet there is still no consensus as to why the
crisis has become so severe, and thus many authors have attempted to determine the factors that
have exacerbated the crisis.
One possible mechanism via which the opioid crisis may have grown is through an increasing
supply of prescription opioids. Powell et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between the medical
opioid supply and opioid overdoses using di↵erential Medicare Part D adoption as a proxy for the
medical opioid supply. Medicare Part D is the Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit Program, which
was an expansion of insurance for prescription drugs. Because this program largely a↵ected older
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members of the population, its impact on the supply of medical opioids di↵ered geographically based
on the proportion of people in each state that were eligible. Thus, although Medicare Part D was
rolled out at the same time across all states, the resulting increase in prescription opioids di↵ered
based on the proportion of each state that was eligible for the program. Exploiting this di↵erential
availability of medical opioids, Powell et al. find that a 10 percent increase in the opioid supply
is associated with a 7.4 percent increase in opioid-related deaths for Medicare-ineligible citizens,
which suggests that prescribed painkillers are highly diverted to non-medical markets. Powell et
al. conclude that increasing medical access to painkillers will continue to increase the non-medical
supply of opioids, resulting in higher opioid-related mortality rates. Thus, the authors recommend
that expansion of Medicare account for potential spillovers of prescription opioids into non-medical
markets (Powell et al., 2016).
Another proposed determinant of the opioid crisis is economic downturn. In the first study of the
association between economic conditions and drug use, Carpenter et al. (2017) find that economic
downturns lead to increases in substance abuse, particularly for white males with low education.
Hollingsworth et al. (2017) reach similar conclusions, finding that as a county’s unemployment rate
rises, the opioid death rate and rate of overdose-related emergency department visits increase as
well. Hollingsworth et al. propose that the increase in opioid abuse is due to mental health problems
that manifest during periods of economic downturn. However, Ruhm (2018) finds that the positive
relationship between economic decline and drug-related mortality is weak and can be explained
by county characteristics a↵ecting economic conditions, concluding that economic conditions do
not play a major role in the opioid epidemic. Currie et al. (2018) also examine the relationship
between employment and opioid-related mortality, suggesting that either high opioid prescription
rates lead to increased addiction, which causes unemployment, or conversely, rural communities
may have high unemployment, which causes the unemployed to turn to opioid abuse. Similarly
to Ruhm, Currie et al. find no causal relationship between opioids and employment and conclude
that improving economic conditions alone may not be su cient to address the opioid crisis. These
mixed results underscore the di culty of understanding the determinants of the opioid epidemic,
which makes it equally di cult to find adequate solutions.
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1.2 Proposed solutions to the opioid crisis
In the face of the growing opioid epidemic and its unclear determinants, there are many proposed
remedies. There has been a surge in Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs), which have
been found to have mixed results (Evans et al., 2018). Buchmueller and Carey (2018) find that
state laws requiring opioid providers to access PDMPs under suspicious circumstances significantly
reduce misuse of prescription opioids, but when state law does not require PDMP access, there is
no e↵ect on opioid misuse. However, the authors find no significant e↵ects of PDMP laws on opioid
poisoning.
Another proposed solution to the opioid crisis is the manufacturing of abuse-deterrent opioids,
reformulations of pills such as OxyContin that are harder to crush and thus to abuse. Evans
et al. (2018) find that the 2010 reformulation of OxyContin led users to substitute to heroin, a
cheaper alternative, so the reformulation was associated with a decrease in prescription opioid-
related mortality but an increase in heroin-related mortality. Due to this substitution, abuse-
deterrent opioids may not be an e↵ective method to address the opioid epidemic.
Another proposed solution to the opioid crisis is expanded insurance coverage of opioid addiction
treatment. McInerney (2017) exploits the di↵erential expansion of Medicaid by states after the
A↵ordable Care Act to find that public insurance expansion decreased opioid-related mortality
by 26%. McInerney concludes that the expansion of Medicaid successfully granted opioid users
covered by insurance access to prescriptions to treat their addiction. Thus, insurance expansion
had a positive e↵ect on reducing opioid-related mortality. McInerney promotes expansion of public
insurance coverage and substance abuse treatment to combat the opioid epidemic (McInerney,
2017). However, prescriptions to treat opioid addiction are only useful for those who seek treatment
and do nothing to serve those who do not.
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1.3 Naloxone
Another proposal to combat the opioid epidemic is expanded access to Naloxone, a drug admin-
istered via injection or nasal spray.1 When administered quickly, Naloxone can prevent an opioid
overdose from becoming fatal by reversing the overdose symptoms and reviving the user (Legal
Science, 2017). Initially, Naloxone was administered only by EMS and medical o cials. However,
around 2010 states began to pass laws that granted Naloxone access to third parties, meaning
that individuals besides those experiencing the overdose, such as a family member or friend, could
purchase Naloxone2 without prescriptions (Legal Science, 2017). As mortality rates due to opioid
overdoses continued to rise, more states began to pass these “third-party” access laws in the hopes
that they would help to combat growing opioid-related mortality (Erfanian et al., 2018). Figure 3
presents the adoption of third-party Naloxone access laws over time. The maps reflect that Nalox-
one access expanded early on the coasts, and it took the longest for third-party access laws to be
passed in the center of the United States.
The theoretical impacts of Naloxone access are unclear. On one hand, third-party Naloxone
access means that those close to users can prepare to administer Naloxone in the case of an overdose,
which has the potential to save many lives. However, once revived, the majority of overdose victims
choose not to call 911 or go to the hospital, so they do not immediately seek treatment for addiction
(Rees et al., 2017). It is also possible that opioid users may be riskier with their use of opioids if
they know that their risk of mortality is lowered, a behavior known as moral hazard (Doleac and
Mukherjee, 2018).
In the first study of the impact of Naloxone access laws on opioid-related mortality, Rees et al.
(2017) consider the impact of Naloxone access in conjunction with Good Samaritan laws, which
provide legal immunity to those who call for medical assistance in the case of a drug overdose. The
authors consider Naloxone access and Good Samaritan laws together because they are considered
1The major Naloxone brands are Narcan and Evzio.
2The cost of a single dose of Naloxone varies widely. Generic Naloxone can be purchased for between $20 and $40 in
a drugstore, while brand-name Narcan costs $150 for two doses and an Evzio auto-injector costs over $4500 (Gupta
et al., 2016). However, Naloxone is covered by most health insurance plans and many community organizations
provide free doses of Naloxone (Abrams, 2018).
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complementary in addressing the opioid epidemic, as immunity from prosecution encourages calling
for Naloxone administration in the case of an overdose. Rees et al. find that Naloxone access laws
are associated with a decrease of approximately 10 percent in opioid-related mortality, but the
impact of Good Samaritan laws is not statistically significant. Further, they find that two years
after the adoption of a Naloxone access law, the e↵ect is even stronger, with a 20 percent decrease
in opioid-related mortality. The authors conclude that Naloxone access laws have positive impacts
on reducing opioid-related mortality, and they should be coupled with immunity laws to strengthen
their e↵ect on the opioid crisis (Rees et al., 2017).
Other authors have found null or negative e↵ects of Naloxone access on opioid-related mortality.
Erfanian et al. (2018) attempt to measure the impact of Naloxone access laws on opioid-related
mortality rates using CDC data on overdose death rates by state. The authors find that the impact
of Naloxone access laws depends on the provisions of the access laws, but across multiple provisions,
there is no statistically significant evidence that access laws reduce opioid-related mortality. The
authors also find that Naloxone access laws have regional e↵ects because the laws in each state
create spillovers to neighboring states, and these spillover e↵ects are larger in magnitude than the
direct e↵ects in individual states. The authors conclude that Naloxone should not be considered a
solution to the opioid crisis and should instead be considered only a treatment for opioid overdoses
(Erfanian et al., 2018).
Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) exploit the di↵erential adoption of Naloxone access laws to deter-
mine if Naloxone access increases opioid-related mortality. They argue that Naloxone access may
increase opioid use via two channels: it may make riskier opioid use more appealing, and it may
save the lives of drug users who will continue abusing opioids. It is important to note that increased
Naloxone access also has the potential to save the lives of drug users who can then go on to seek
help for their addiction. The authors adapt the moral hazard model developed by Peltzman (1975)
who looked at the impact of seat belt laws on risky driving. Peltzman found that regulation did not
appear to reduce accident mortality because the decreased deaths due to regulation were o↵set by
increased risk-taking by drivers (Peltzman, 1975). Doleac and Mukherjee’s model and findings are
consistent with this and other studies of moral hazard. They find that increased Naloxone access
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leads to increases in opioid-related emergency room visits, but does not decrease opioid-related
mortality, confirming the moral hazard story that increased Naloxone access prompts riskier opioid
use (Doleac and Mukherjee, 2018).
There is thus a conflict in the literature between the findings of Doleac and Mukherjee (2018)
and Rees et al. (2017). However, Doleac and Mukherjee argue that their methods are preferable to
Rees et al. because they use data at the monthly city and county level instead of at the annual state
level and control for a larger number of laws, allowing them to measure their e↵ects more precisely.
Further, the authors argue that their “inclusion of 2015 data allows [them] to examine e↵ects in
more jurisdictions, since the vast majority of states passed Naloxone access laws in 2014 or later,
and examining a broader set of outcome measures allows [the authors] to paint a more complete
picture of these laws’ e↵ects on opioid abuse” (Doleac and Mukherjee, 2018). The authors suggest
that the more years and the finer the geographic measures considered, the better the analysis.
While there is no consensus on the impact of Naloxone access on opioid-related mortality, the key
takeaway from this body of research is that the impacts of Naloxone access vary based upon regions
and time periods considered as well as the mechanisms via which Naloxone impacts opioid misuse.
1.4 Social capital
Another significant factor in the research into the opioid crisis is social capital. Social capital,
equivalently understood as the strength of community ties and networks, has been decreasing in
the United States since 1950, based on surveys of participation in civic organizations (Putnam,
2001). Yet social capital is incredibly important to improving health outcomes, and in particular,
it impacts the resiliency of a county in responding to opioid addiction (Zoorob and Salemi, 2017).
Social capital is significant in the context of the opioid crisis because it may influence the capacity
of a community to fight opioid addiction, instead of isolating addicts who need help. Zoorob and
Salemi (2017) provide empirical evidence for this by documenting the relationship between the level
of social capital and the opioid crisis. Using social capital data from Rupasingha et al. (2006), the
authors find that there is a large and statistically significant inverse association between the level
of social capital in a county and the opioid overdose-related mortality rate. Zoorob et al. also
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explain the mechanisms via which social capital influences opioid-related mortality. Social capital
may prevent initial drug addiction by providing alternatives to drug use; it may help with recovery
from addiction, and it may help to reduce the mortality rate for individual cases of addiction.
Additionally, social capital may guide individuals to ask for help in the case of an overdose because
they feel safer in doing so as a part of a strong community (Zoorob and Salemi, 2017).
The well-documented relationship between social capital and opioid-related mortality makes it
clear that researchers must consider the impact of social capital when trying to understand and
address the opioid crisis. Because social capital may increase the likelihood of seeking treatment,
seeking medical help, and recovering from addiction, it is plausible that it would also interact
favorably with Naloxone access laws to reduce opioid-related mortality. In a community where
there was a higher level of social capital and fewer stigmas about opioid addiction, Naloxone access
may be more e↵ective in saving lives and leading individuals to seek treatment. For example,
if an individual is administered Naloxone in a community with high levels of social capital, the
individual may have a stronger network upon which to rely when seeking treatment, which could
reduce the likelihood of relapse. The same individual receiving Naloxone in a community with low
social capital may not feel the societal pressure to get help for their addiction and may be more
likely to use again. For example, in Dayton, Ohio, frequently labelled the “overdose capital of the
nation,” community organizations are establishing outreach programs that o↵er past opioid users
support in their recovery. One organization goes door-to-door, knocking on the doors of residents
with drug histories. In a Dayton Daily News article, an EMT discusses this community outreach
organization, saying, “It was frustrating to give Narcan [the drug name of Naloxone] over and
over again to that same person without there ever being anything else past that... Now I feel like
we’re actually helping people. There’s something past the Narcan to be able to help someone get
that treatment” (Wedell, 2018). This suggests that individuals dealing with the opioid crisis see
the benefit of social capital toward helping opioid users beyond Naloxone administration, and a
strong community may help opioid users who have been administered Naloxone to overcome their
addiction.
It is also possible that the interaction between Naloxone access and social capital works in the
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opposite direction. If Naloxone access leads to higher opioid-related mortality, consistent with the
moral hazard theory in Doleac and Mukherjee (2018), social capital may exacerbate this e↵ect.
Rupasingha et al. (2006) argue that social capital links people together through their participation
in associational activities, which in turn facilitates information sharing. Many community organi-
zations, which can be seen as contributors to social capital, are responsible for increasing awareness
of and access to Naloxone. Hampshire Hope is a community group in New Hampshire working
to address the opioid crisis by o↵ering public Narcan trainings in libraries, town halls and other
venues (Cherry Sullivan, 2019). Religious groups are getting involved as well, for example, a North
Carolina pastor partnered with the North Carolina Harm Reduction Coalition to deliver needles
and Naloxone to the community (Knopf, 2019). These community organizations are evidence of
the role that social capital can play in increasing awareness of Naloxone.
In the case of Naloxone functioning as a fallback option for opioid users who do not seek
treatment, knowledge of Naloxone access is crucial. Naloxone access laws may prompt riskier opioid
use, but spreading awareness through social networks may increase the degree to which opioid users
are aware of Naloxone access and thus the level of risk they bear when using opioids.
The studied relationship between social capital and opioid-related mortality and anecdotal ev-
idence of the importance of social capital in treating addiction after Naloxone administration are
suggestive of an interaction between Naloxone access and social capital beyond their individual im-
pacts. However, the interaction of social capital and Naloxone access as they a↵ect opioid-related
mortality has not yet been studied. This interaction is the focus of this research.
2. Data
Data on Naloxone access law dates come from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System. This
dataset examines laws in e↵ect between 2001 and 2017. Laws mentioning “opioid,” “opioid antag-
onist” and “Naloxone” were considered, and those laws were categorized depending on the type
of access they grant. The final dataset includes all laws that meet the criteria to be Naloxone
access laws and includes data on the type of access law and the date they went into e↵ect, by
state. To describe the type of access law, responses to the questions “Are prescriptions of Naloxone
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authorized to third parties?” and “Are prescribers/laypeople required to act with reasonable care?”
are included for all laws. I create an indicator variable from this data for whether a state has a
third-party Naloxone access law in each year.
Data on opioid-related mortality rates by county come from the CDC Multiple Cause of Death
WONDER Database. This dataset contains the number of deaths by cause of death and county,
based upon filed death certificates, for 2011–2016. I follow the methodology of Powell et al. (2016)
and code deaths related to prescription opioid pain relievers using the ICD-10 external cause of
injury codes (X40–X44, X60–64, X85, or Y10–Y14) and drug identification codes (T40.1–T40.4),
which indicate death by any opioid analgesic. A major limitation of this dataset is that for counties
with death rates that are lower than 10, instead of calculating a crude death rate, the database
classifies them as “unreliable,” and suppresses the number of deaths in that year.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for counties with and without opioid-related mortality rates.
There are statistically significant di↵erences between the sample means for each variable in the table.
Counties with recorded rates are on average more populous, wealthier, and more diverse, consistent
with the understanding that more populous counties will have a greater number of deaths in each
year, so those values are less likely to be suppressed. The counties with recorded opioid-related
mortality rates also have lower social capital, higher opioid prescribing rates, and higher average
deaths due to overdoses.
The suppressed low mortality rates pose a problem for analysis, because it limits the number of
counties I am able to include in my regressions. In order to address this concern, I run my regressions
of interest on two samples: counties with recorded opioid overdose-related deaths and counties with
recorded overdose deaths, which I argue serves as a proxy for opioid deaths. The second sample
allows me to slightly increase the number of observations I include without compromising the
relationship that I am studying. While the larger sample leads to more robust analysis, is does not
fully address the di↵erences between the full sample and the sample with recorded mortality rates.
The implications of this sample limitation will be discussed in Section 4.
Figure 4 validates the use of overdose deaths as a substitute for opioid overdose deaths. The
two measures track very closely over time, suggesting that the upward trend in overdose deaths is
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driven by the trend in opioid overdose deaths. I therefore deem it appropriate to include all overdose
deaths as a proxy for opioid overdose deaths to increase my sample size. However, there are still
drawbacks with the two limited samples I use. A county is more likely to be in this sample either
if it is very populous, as it would have a su cient number of overdose deaths not to be suppressed,
or because it has very high overdose mortality rates. This is important to take into consideration
when evaluating the results.
Data on social capital comes from Rupasingha et al. (2006). In this paper, the authors combine
data from the Census, County Business Patterns, National Center for Charitable Statistics, and
Regional Economic Information System. Arguing that social capital comes from community partici-
pation in activities that facilitate cooperation and information-sharing, the authors use the number
of civic organizations, bowling centers, golf clubs, fitness centers, sports organizations, religious
organizations, political organizations, labor organizations, business organizations and professional
organizations per county to construct an index of social capital using principal component analysis.
Figures 5 and 6 present the distribution of the constructed social capital index for the opioid mor-
tality rate sample and the overdose mortality rate sample, respectively. In both samples the social
capital index is approximately normally distributed around -.5, and approximately 80 percent of
each sample has a social capital index below 0. For all counties, by contrast, the average social
capital index is 0 and the median is -.23, so the counties in these samples have lower-than-average
social capital. This is expected, as the counties in these samples have higher-than-average opioid-
related mortality rates, and Zoorob and Salemi (2017) find that lower social capital is associated
with higher opioid-related mortality.
Data on opioid prescribing rates by county come from the CDC’s U.S. Opioid Prescribing Rate
Maps. This source presents opioid prescription rates per 100 persons by county for 2011 to 2016,
and data is available for approximately 90% of counties.
Data on the number of people below the poverty line, median age and percent of each county
that is male come from the 2017 American Community Survey (ACS), and data on percent of a
county of each race, percent of each county with certain education levels, percent of each county
with health insurance, and percent of each county below the poverty line comes from the 2015 ACS.
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Urban-rural classification data come from the National Center for Health Statistics Urban Rural
Classification Scheme. Micropolitan and noncore counties were classified as rural. Finally, data on
county unemployment levels for 2011–2016 comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The data were merged by year and county FIPS code, and only years 2011–2016 when all
variables are available were included. While Rees et al. (2017) use data through 2014, Doleac and
Mukherjee (2018) use data through 2015 and argue that the inclusion of the extra year allows them
to look at more jurisdictions because some states did not pass Naloxone access laws until 2014. My
inclusion of 2016 further improves upon these measures because I am able to estimate the impact
of Naloxone access laws more precisely for states with later Naloxone access law passage. The final
dataset is an unbalanced county-level panel that contains between 457 and 725 counties a year over
the years 2011–2016.
Figure 7 shows which counties are included in the samples and Table 2 presents summary
statistics. For both samples, the mean number of deaths per 10,000 due to opioids is 1.49, the
mean number of deaths per 10,000 due to overdoses is approximately 1.6, and the mean number of
total deaths per 10,000 is approximately 89. The mean social capital index is approximately -.54
for both samples. The lower average population in the second sample reflects the inclusion of less
populous counties as a broader category of mortality rate is used.
3. Empirical strategy
The goal of these regressions is to estimate the impact of Naloxone access laws and social capital on
opioid use, using opioid-related mortality and overdose-related mortality as proxies for opioid use.
I hypothesize that there will be a null or positive relationship between Naloxone access and opioid-
related mortality and a negative relationship between social capital and opioid-related mortality.
To test these hypotheses, I use fixed e↵ects and demographic controls to isolate the impacts of
Naloxone access and social capital on opioid-related mortality.
14
3.1 Fixed e↵ects regression
First, I examine the basic relationship between Naloxone access and opioid-related mortality rates
over time. To do this, I run the following fixed e↵ects regression.
MRct =  0 +  1NAct + ↵c +  t + ✏ct (1)
MRct is the number of opioid-related deaths per 10,000 people in county c and year t. NAct is
an indicator for whether county c has a third-party Naloxone access law in year t. The term ↵c is
a fixed e↵ect for each county and the term  t is an indicator variable for each year with 2011 as
the reference year, included to control for any trends in opioid-related mortality over time that are
uncorrelated with Naloxone access.
The coe cient of interest is  1, which represents the change in the opioid-related mortality rate
associated with third-party Naloxone access. The magnitude of  1 is interpreted as the change in
opioid-related deaths per 10,000 people in a county associated with the passage of a third-party
Naloxone access law. I expect to find  1 to be positive or zero, which would be consistent with the
moral hazard theory that predicts Naloxone access leads to increases in opioid-related mortality.
3.2 Demographic controls
Ideally, the next step would be to add a variable for the social capital index in each county to
regression 1. However, the social capital data from Rupasingha et al. (2006) is time-invariant and
therefore prevents the use of fixed e↵ects. Thus, instead of using county fixed e↵ects as in regression
1, I include demographic controls in an attempt to adjust for all county-level characteristics besides
Naloxone access and social capital that would have an impact on opioid-related mortality. In
regression 2, I replicate regression 1 using demographic controls instead of fixed e↵ects to test the
validity of my demographic controls.
MRct =  0 +  1NAct +Xct +  t + ✏ct (2)
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The term Xct is a vector of demographic controls including percent white, percent male, percent
college graduates, median age, population, unemployment rate, percent below the poverty line in
the past year, percent with health insurance, opioid prescription rate per 100 persons, and an
indicator variable for urban classification.
Variables for race, education, age and gender are included to control for demographic char-
acteristics that may have an impact on the opioid-related mortality rate or opioid addiction in
general. Poverty, unemployment and urban status are included to control for economic conditions
in a county that may impact opioid use. As the literature suggests that drug use increases in poor
economic conditions, it is necessary to control for economic conditions over the time period of the
sample in order to isolate the e↵ect of the variables of interest on Naloxone access.
The health insurance variable is included to control for the access to prescription opioids covered
by insurance. The opioid prescription rate is included to control for the supply of prescription
opioids in a county, with the idea that a county that has a high opioid prescribing rate may have a
greater supply of medical opioids available to be diverted to non-medical markets.
After verifying that the demographic controls lead to similar results to those in the fixed e↵ects
regression, I add the social capital variable in regression 3.
MRct =  0 +  1NAct +  2SCc +Xct +  t + ✏ct (3)
The coe cients of interest are  1, the coe cient on Naloxone access, and  2, which is the coe cient
on the level of social capital in a county. I expect  1 to be positive or zero, as in the previous
regression, and I expect  2 to be negative, which would be consistent with the literature that finds
social capital to reduce opioid-related mortality.
3.3 Interaction term
In regression 4, I add an interaction term between the Naloxone access indicator and social capital.
This specification allows me to estimate the impact of Naloxone access on opioid-related mortality
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depending on the level of social capital.
MRct =  0 +  1NAct +  2SCc +  3(NA⇥ SC)ct +Xct +  t + ✏ct (4)
In this specification, the coe cients of interest are  1,  2, and  3.  1 is interpreted to be the
change in opioid-related mortality per 10,000 in a county associated with a Naloxone access law,
and is expected to be positive or zero, as above. The estimate of  2 is the change in opioid-related
mortality associated with a certain level of social capital in a county, and is expected to be negative,
as above.
The interpretation of  3 is more complicated. It gives the e↵ect of Naloxone access on opioid-
related mortality associated with a certain level of social capital. That is, it will show whether
social capital makes Naloxone access more or less e↵ective at reducing opioid-related mortality.
The literature does not o↵er much insight into the likely sign of this coe cient. It is possible that
a county with strong social capital would be better equipped to guide opioid users from addiction
to treatment after being administered Naloxone. If this were the case,  3 would be negative.
However, it is also possible that a county with high social capital may have greater information
sharing, which would increase the awareness of Naloxone access and could exacerbate its moral
hazard e↵ects, leading to a positively-signed  3.
There are some concerns with this approach that must be addressed in order to interpret any
results as causal. First, there is potential endogeneity within the timing of Naloxone access laws
if opioid-related mortality rates drive Naloxone access law passage. Another concern is that the
coe cient on Naloxone access may instead be picking up some trend in mortality rates that is not
specifically associated with Naloxone access. I address these concerns in Section 5.
4. Results
The results of regression 1 are presented in Table 3. Column 1 presents the regression run on the
opioid overdose-related mortality sample and column 2 presents the regression run on the overdose-
related mortality sample, where overdose-related mortality rates are assumed to be a proxy for
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opioid-related mortality rates. The coe cients on the year indicator variables, where 2011 is the
reference year, reflect the increasing trend in mortality rates over time for both samples. The
coe cient on Naloxone access is not statistically significant for the first sample, which suggests there
is no clear relationship between expanded Naloxone access and opioid-related mortality. Thus, the
results in column 1 are consistent with the current literature (Doleac and Mukherjee, 2018; Erfanian
et al., 2018). However, the coe cient on Naloxone access in column 2 is statistically significant
and positive, suggesting expanded Naloxone access is associated with increased overdose mortality,
although the e↵ect is small.
The results of regression 2 are presented in Table 4. This regression uses demographic controls
by county instead of county fixed e↵ects as in Table 3. Across both samples, Naloxone access
is associated with higher opioid-related mortality rates. The estimate in column 1 suggests that
passage of a Naloxone access law is associated with .07 more opioid-related deaths per 10,000 people,
an increase of approximately 5%, and the estimate in column 2 suggests that passage of a Naloxone
access law is associated with .11 more overdose-related deaths per 10,000 people, an increase of
approximately 7%. The coe cients on Naloxone access are larger than those in the fixed e↵ects
regression and the current literature, which suggests that the regression with demographic controls
may be overestimating the impact of Naloxone access. However, the larger coe cient estimate is
logical in the context of the sample selection. Because counties with higher opioid-related mortality
rates are both more likely to be included in the sample and more likely to experience the impacts
of Naloxone access, it is logical that these regressions would overestimate the true magnitude of the
e↵ect of Naloxone access on opioid use.
The coe cient estimate for health insurance is positive, confirming the narrative that those with
health insurance go to the doctor and are more likely to be prescribed and then become addicted to
prescription opioids. The coe cient on the opioid prescribing rate is positive as well, suggestive of
diversion of prescription opioids to non-medical markets. For the remainder of the controls, signs
align with expectations.
The results of regression 3, where the social capital variable is added, are presented in Table 5.
The coe cients on Naloxone access are very similar to those presented in Table 4. The coe cient
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on social capital is negative in columns 1 and 2, as expected. This suggests a higher social capital
index is associated with lower opioid-related mortality, consistent with the findings of Zoorob and
Salemi (2017). As in regression 1, the coe cients on the year indicator variables are positive, and
the signs and magnitudes of the coe cients in the second column are very similar to those in the
first.
Finally, the results of regression 4 are presented in Table 6. The coe cients on the year indicator
variables and demographic controls are similar in magnitude and significance to those in Tables 4 and
5. The coe cients on Naloxone access are positive and larger than in Table 5, and the coe cients
on social capital are larger in magnitude, while still negative, than in Table 5.
The coe cient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. This is inter-
preted to mean Naloxone access increases opioid-related mortality rates more in counties with high
social capital than in counties with low social capital. These results point to the second potential
explanation regarding the interaction between social capital and Naloxone access. As discussed
before, the information-sharing aspect of social capital may worsen the moral hazard impact of
Naloxone access. In a county with higher social capital, it may be that more opioid users are
aware of Naloxone and will use opioids more frequently or in greater quantities because they know
community members are willing and able to administer Naloxone in the case of an overdose.3
Another explanation is that in a county with high social capital, people who are addicted to
opioids feel more comfortable using Naloxone instead of seeking treatment. In this case, social
capital would still reduce overall mortality rates, but Naloxone access would lead to riskier use in
counties with high social capital. In the same vein, it is also possible that acceptance of opioid
addiction in counties with high social capital becomes enabling, which would lead to a worse e↵ect
of Naloxone access in those counties. Regardless of the explanation, the positive coe cient on the
interaction term suggests more research is needed into the interaction between social capital and
Naloxone access.
3This could be thought of under an intent-to-treat vs. intensity of treatment framework. Naloxone access law passage
could be considered the treatment, but the intensity of the treatment (and the resulting moral hazard response)
may di↵er substantially depending on awareness of Naloxone and the frequency of its use by non-medical personnel.
Social capital and information sharing may increase the intensity of treatment under this framework.
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5. Endogeneity concerns
5.1 Potential endogeneity in access law timing
A primary concern in this analysis is the potential endogeneity within the timing of Naloxone access
laws. It is plausible that states with higher opioid-related mortality rates passed Naloxone access
laws earlier than states where opioid-related mortality was less concerning. If this were true, there
would be higher opioid-related mortality in states with earlier Naloxone access law passage. This
could lead to two possible estimation errors. If Naloxone access laws reduce opioid-related mortality,
then it would lead to an underestimation of the impact of Naloxone on reducing opioid-related
deaths, as places where the laws were passed earlier would have higher increases in opioid-related
mortality than places where access laws were passed later. Conversely, if Naloxone access laws
increase opioid-related mortality or have little e↵ect, as in Doleac and Mukherjee (2018), endogenous
timing of Naloxone access laws would lead to an overestimation of the impact of Naloxone access
laws on reducing opioid-related mortality. It would also be possible that any regressions with the
Naloxone access variable as the dependent variable of interest would not capture the impact of
the law, but instead would capture the underlying trends in overdose deaths that led to the law’s
passage. It is thus necessary to confirm that there is no association between opioid-related mortality
rates and the timing of Naloxone access laws.
The literature addresses this endogeneity concern in di↵erent ways. Doleac and Mukherjee
(2018) attempt to control for trends and policies correlated with the timing of Naloxone access
laws, as well as show pre-trends in their coe cient plots that eliminate this endogeneity concern for
di↵erent outcome measures. Erfanian et al. (2018) examine overdose rates in the year prior to the
enactment of access laws and perform a t-test to show that there is no statistical di↵erence between
access law states and no access law states.
To address this endogeneity concern, I plot opioid-related mortality rates in 2010 against the
time since 2010 that a Naloxone access law is passed for both counties and states, shown in Figures
8 and 9. These plots reflect no clear association between opioid-related mortality rates in 2010 and
20
the timing of the Naloxone access law passage. To confirm this result, I also regress time since 2010
that a Naloxone access law is passed on mortality rates in 2010. Illinois, New Mexico and New
York are excluded because they passed access laws before 2010, and Delaware is excluded because
its access law was passed after 2016. These regressions, presented in Table 7, confirm that there is
no statistically significant association between opioid-related mortality rates in 2010 and the timing
of Naloxone access law passage.
5.2 Placebo test
Another concern with this analysis is that the coe cient on Naloxone access is picking up an
underlying variable excluded from regressions 1–4 that is driving changes in mortality rates. In
this case, the regressions would not be meaningful because the significance of the Naloxone access
coe cient would not be picking up the e↵ect of Naloxone access but instead another factor such as
policy changes, economic despair, increased risky behavior, or health trends (Doleac and Mukherjee,
2018). To address this concern, I follow Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) and replicate my regressions
of interest with deaths due to transport accidents, which should not be a↵ected by Naloxone access,
as the outcome variable. If there were some underlying cause driving increases in mortality rates
besides the passage of Naloxone access laws that I did not control for in my regressions, then there
would be a statistically significant coe cient on Naloxone access for tra c accidents as well.
Tables 8, 9, 10 and 11 present the results of these regressions, and Figure 10 shows a graph
of opioid deaths versus transport accident deaths over time. There are no statistically significant
associations between Naloxone access and transport accidents in any of the regressions, which
confirms that the changes in opioid-related mortality picked up by the Naloxone access variable are
not due to an underlying factor unaccounted for in the regressions. Further, Figure 10 reflects that
transport accident deaths and opioid-related deaths are trending very di↵erently, thus it is intuitive
that there are factors driving opioid-related mortality but not a↵ecting transport accident-related
mortality. These results confirm that Naloxone access and social capital both have impacts on
opioid-related mortality that are captured in the main regressions.
21
5.3 Inclusion of additional counties
Another potential concern with this analysis stems from the di↵erences in the magnitudes of coef-
ficients between the two samples across regressions 1 through 4. Because the coe cient estimates
on Naloxone access are higher for the overdose sample than for the opioid overdose sample in each
regression, it is possible that there is a stronger association between Naloxone access and overdose
mortality than between Naloxone access and opioid overdose mortality. Further, a recent CDC
Morbidity and Mortality Report documents an increasing trend in non-opioid overdoses since 2012,
particularly deaths from cocaine and psychostimulants. The report notes that these overdose deaths
are increasing both with and without opioid involvement (Kariisa et al., 2019). If Naloxone access
a↵ects non-opioid overdose deaths as well, such as by preventing death due to opioid overdoses but
delaying mortality to overdoses on other drugs, then Naloxone access could be driving this trend
in overdose deaths. If that were the case, overdose deaths should not be thought of as a proxy for
opioid overdose deaths.
To address this concern, I run the four regressions of interest on only the 306 counties that are
not included in the opioid overdose sample but are included in the overdose sample. This way, I
test whether there is an impact of Naloxone access on overdose mortality in counties without high
opioid overdose mortality. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 12. The lack of
significance of the coe cients on Naloxone access signals that Naloxone access does not influence
overdose mortality in any way other than through opioid overdose mortality, and the inclusion of
the additional 306 counties in the second sample is not driving the main results.
5.4 Reverse causality
There is also the possibility of reverse causality between social capital and opioid-related mortality,
as research documents the fragmentation of communities with pervasive opioid use (Quinones,
2015). If this were the case, then it would be possible that the estimated e↵ect of social capital
on opioid-related mortality is not an accurate representation of the actual impact of social capital.
However, it is unlikely that the social capital index used in this research would be directly influenced
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by opioid-related mortality. The social capital index is constructed as an aggregate measure of the
number of bowling alleys, civic centers, churches, and other community organizations (Rupasingha
et al., 2006). There is little evidence that opioid-related mortality would lead to su cient closure
of these community organizations to erode the social capital measure, and thus reverse causality is
not a significant concern for this analysis.
6. Conclusion
The significance of this research in the current literature is threefold. First, it confirms the findings
of Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) that moral hazard theory applies to opioid use. The positive and
statistically significant coe cients on Naloxone access, while likely overestimating the true e↵ect
of Naloxone access due to sample selection, suggest that Naloxone access leads to an increase in
opioid- and overdose-related mortality, consistent with the theory that opioid users will use greater
quantities of opioids or escalate their use of opioids if Naloxone is available to them as a safety net.
For policymakers, this should be a reminder that Naloxone access must be coupled with expanded
treatment options in order to be an e↵ective remedy against opioid addiction, and Naloxone access
should not be considered a mechanism to fight the opioid crisis directly.
Second, this research confirms the findings of Zoorob and Salemi (2017) that social capital has an
inverse relationship with opioid-related mortality. This is important information for policymakers,
because it suggests that investments in social capital such as increased spending on community
organizations can be e↵ective tools in addressing the opioid crisis.
Third, this research finds that social capital increases the negative impacts of expanded Naloxone
access. There are multiple potential explanations for this result, but the most promising has to do
with the compounded e↵ects of moral hazard. Because social capital enables information sharing,
the moral hazard impacts of Naloxone access may be exacerbated in communities where knowledge
about Naloxone access is spread broadly.
Regardless of the reasons for the positive coe cient on the interaction term, it signifies that this
is an area that demands further study, and there are many potential avenues for future research.
Obtaining access to opioid-related mortality data for all counties is imperative, in order to properly
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estimate the impact of Naloxone access for the entire country. Another potential next step is to
construct a time-variant index of social capital so that fixed e↵ects regressions could be used to
study the impact of social capital on opioid-related mortality. It could also be useful to examine the
lagged impact of Naloxone access, in order to understand how the magnitude of the e↵ect changes
over time.
Stopping pervasive opioid addiction, creating su cient treatment for all addicts, and preventing
new addiction require many steps, and the tools that are e↵ective in some communities may not
be appropriate in others. Examination of the role of social capital and its interaction with policies
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Figure 1: Opioid overdose deaths per 10,000 people by county
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Figure 2: Overdose deaths by category








Figure 3: Adoption of third-party Naloxone access laws
Data source: Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System, 2017.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for recorded and non-recorded mortality rate samples
Variable Recorded rates Missing rates Di↵erence
Social Capital index -.54 .11 .65***
(.63) (1.3) (.024)
Percent white .8 .85 .048***
(.15) (.17) (.0032)
Population 427556 34447 -393109***
(690445) (47541) (5623)
Unemployment rate .067 .071 .0049***
(.022) (.033) (.00062)
Percent with health insurance .88 .86 -.021***
(.042) (.056) (.001)
Percent with income below the poverty line .18 .21 .03***
(.07) (.092) (.0017)
US county prescribing rate per 100 persons 90 86 -3.1***
(39) (50) (.94)
Percent with college degree .3 .2 -.1***
(.11) (.08) (.0016)
Urban county .87 .27 -.6***
(.34) (.44) (.0083)
Median age 39 41 2.6***
(4.2) (5.3) (.1)
Percent male .49 .5 .011***
(.0099) (.026) (.00046)
Deaths per 10,000 due to opioids 1.5 – –
(1.2) – –
Deaths per 10,000 due to overdoses 1.6 1.2 -.41***
(1.3) (.94) (.075)
Deaths per 10,000 89 109 19***
(24) (27) (.52)
Observations 3,213 16,134 19,347
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Data
sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2013, 2015, 2017), BLS
(yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006). This table shows summary statistics for
the samples of interest. Column 1 presents summary statistics for the sample with recorded
CDC mortality rates. Column 2 presents summary statistics for the sample with missing
CDC mortality rates. Column 3 presents the di↵erence between means for each sample and
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Figure 5: Distribution of social capital index for counties with opioid mortality rate data
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Figure 6: Distribution of social capital index for counties with overdose mortality rate data





























Table 2: Summary statistics for each sample
Variable Opioid overdoses All overdoses
Social Capital index -.543 -.539
(.631) (.643)




Unemployment rate .0665 .0672
(.0224) (.0231)
Percent with health insurance .883 .882
(.0421) (.043)
Percent with income below the poverty line .177 .178
(.0697) (.0706)
US county prescribing rate per 100 persons 89.5 90
(38.8) (39)
Percent with college degree .295 .291
(.106) (.106)
Urban county .869 .861
(.337) (.346)
Median age 38.6 38.5
(4.19) (4.26)
Percent male .491 .492
(.00988) (.0105)
Deaths per 10,000 due to opioids 1.49 1.49
(1.24) (1.24)
Deaths per 10,000 due to overdoses 1.63 1.6
(1.28) (1.26)
Deaths per 10,000 89.4 89.6
(24.2) (24.4)
Observations 3,213 3,523
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016),
PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2013, 2015, 2017), BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and
Rupasingha et al. (2006). This table shows summary statistics for the two samples
used for analysis. Column 1 presents summary statistics for the sample with recorded
opioid overdose-related mortality rates. Column 2 presents summary statistics for
the sample with recorded overdose-related mortality rates.
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Table 3: E↵ect of Naloxone access on opioid-related mortality with fixed e↵ects
(1) (2)












Mean dependent variable 1.497 1.604
Observations 3183 3489
R-Squared 0.248 0.242
County Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Sample Opioid overdoses All overdoses
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors
are shown in parentheses. Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-
2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2013, 2015, 2017),
BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006). This ta-
ble shows the association between Naloxone access and opioid-
related mortality, including county-level fixed e↵ects and con-
trolling for year. Column 1 presents the results with the out-
come variable as deaths per 10,000 in a county due to opioid
overdoses. Column 2 presents the results with the outcome
variable as deaths per 10,000 in a county due to all overdoses.
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Table 4: E↵ect of Naloxone access on opioid-related mortality with demographic controls
(1) (2)
Had Naloxone access 0.071⇤ 0.105⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.036)




Unemployment rate 1.592 1.296
(2.292) (2.086)
Percent with health insurance 4.348⇤⇤⇤ 4.591⇤⇤⇤
(1.053) (1.006)
Percent with income below the poverty line 5.693⇤⇤⇤ 6.300⇤⇤⇤
(1.165) (1.076)
US county prescribing rate per 100 persons 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.002) (0.001)
Percent with college degree -0.497 -0.336
(0.469) (0.435)
Urban county -0.558⇤⇤⇤ -0.478⇤⇤⇤
(0.118) (0.111)
Median age 0.025⇤⇤⇤ 0.028⇤⇤⇤
(0.009) (0.008)












Mean dependent variable 1.497 1.604
Observations 3183 3489
R-Squared 0.250 0.243
County Fixed E↵ects No No
Sample Opioid overdoses All overdoses
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are shown in parenthe-
ses. Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS
(2013, 2015, 2017), BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006). This
table shows the association between Naloxone access and opioid-related mortality
with demographic controls. Column 1 presents the results with the outcome vari-
able as deaths per 10,000 in a county due to opioid overdoses. Column 2 presents
the results with the outcome variable as deaths per 10,000 in a county due to all
overdoses.
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Table 5: E↵ect of Naloxone access on opioid-related mortality with demographic controls
(1) (2)
Had Naloxone access 0.066⇤ 0.099⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.036)
Social Capital index -0.323⇤⇤⇤ -0.348⇤⇤⇤
(0.079) (0.076)




Unemployment rate 1.039 0.686
(2.313) (2.099)
Percent with health insurance 5.338⇤⇤⇤ 5.709⇤⇤⇤
(1.157) (1.104)
Percent with income below the poverty line 5.920⇤⇤⇤ 6.550⇤⇤⇤
(1.136) (1.050)
US county prescribing rate per 100 persons 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Percent with college degree 0.224 0.451
(0.495) (0.463)
Urban county -0.667⇤⇤⇤ -0.603⇤⇤⇤
(0.120) (0.114)
Median age 0.039⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.009)












Mean dependent variable 1.497 1.604
Observations 3183 3489
R-Squared 0.250 0.243
County Fixed E↵ects No No
Sample Opioid overdoses All overdoses
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2013,
2015, 2017), BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006). This table
shows the association between Naloxone access and opioid-related mortality with
demographic controls. Column 1 presents the results with the outcome variable as
deaths per 10,000 in a county due to opioid overdoses. Column 2 presents the results
with the outcome variable as deaths per 10,000 in a county due to all overdoses.
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Table 6: E↵ect of Naloxone access on opioid-related mortality with demographic controls and interaction term
(1) (2)
Had Naloxone access 0.160⇤⇤⇤ 0.193⇤⇤⇤
(0.047) (0.046)
Social Capital index -0.400⇤⇤⇤ -0.425⇤⇤⇤
(0.089) (0.085)
Naloxone access ⇥ Social capital 0.180⇤⇤⇤ 0.180⇤⇤⇤
(0.065) (0.062)




Unemployment rate 0.776 0.465
(2.314) (2.093)
Percent with health insurance 5.404⇤⇤⇤ 5.777⇤⇤⇤
(1.166) (1.113)
Percent with income below the poverty line 5.980⇤⇤⇤ 6.627⇤⇤⇤
(1.130) (1.046)
US county prescribing rate per 100 persons 0.006⇤⇤⇤ 0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Percent with college degree 0.189 0.429
(0.491) (0.462)
Urban county -0.662⇤⇤⇤ -0.596⇤⇤⇤
(0.120) (0.115)
Median age 0.038⇤⇤⇤ 0.043⇤⇤⇤
(0.010) (0.009)












Mean dependent variable 1.497 1.604
Observations 3183 3489
R-Squared 0.256 0.250
County Fixed E↵ects No No
Sample Opioid overdoses All overdoses
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-
2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2013, 2015, 2017), BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006). This
table shows the association between Naloxone access and opioid-related mortality and adds an interaction term. Column
1 presexnts the results with the outcome variable as deaths per 10,000 in a county due to opioid overdoses. Column 2
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Figure 8: Naloxone access law timing vs. 2010 county-level opioid-related mortality rate
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Figure 9: Naloxone access law timing vs. 2010 state-level opioid-related mortality rate
Data source: CDC and PDAPS
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Table 7: E↵ect of 2010 mortality rate on timing of Naloxone access law passage
(1) (2)
County opioid-related mortality rate in 2010 -0.259
(0.496)




* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors are shown
in parentheses. Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016), PDAPS
(yearly, 2011-2016). This table shows the association between
the timing of Naloxone access law passage and opioid-related
mortality. Column 1 presents the association between county
opioid-related mortality and the days after January 1, 2010 that
a Naloxone access law was passed. Column 2 presents the asso-
ciation between state opioid-related mortality and the days after
January 1, 2010 that a Naloxone access law was passed.
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Table 8: E↵ect of Naloxone access on tra c accident deaths
(1) (2)












Mean dependent variable 1.895 1.895
Observations 5818 5818
R-Squared 0.021 0.021
County Fixed E↵ects Yes Yes
Sample Opioid overdoses All overdoses
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Standard errors are shown in
parentheses. Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016), PDAPS
(yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2015, 2017), BLS (yearly, 2011-2016)
and Rupasingha et al. (2006). This table shows the association
between Naloxone access and tra c accident-related mortality,
with county-level fixed e↵ects and controlling for year. Column
1 presents the results with the outcome variable as tra c acci-
dent deaths per 10,000 in the opioid overdoses sample. Column
2 presents the results with the outcome variable as tra c acci-
dent deaths per 10,000 in the all overdoses sample.
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Table 9: E↵ect of Naloxone access on tra c accident deaths
(1) (2)
Had Naloxone access -0.009 -0.009
(0.021) (0.021)




Unemployment rate -6.186⇤⇤⇤ -6.186⇤⇤⇤
(0.727) (0.727)
Percent with health insurance -4.817⇤⇤⇤ -4.817⇤⇤⇤
(0.815) (0.815)
Percent with income below the poverty line 1.603⇤⇤ 1.603⇤⇤
(0.626) (0.626)
US county prescribing rate per 100 persons -0.001⇤ -0.001⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Percent with college degree -4.844⇤⇤⇤ -4.844⇤⇤⇤
(0.442) (0.442)
Urban county -0.930⇤⇤⇤ -0.930⇤⇤⇤
(0.072) (0.072)
Median age 0.044⇤⇤⇤ 0.044⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008)












Mean dependent variable 1.891 1.891
Observations 5814 5814
R-Squared 0.030 0.030
County Fixed E↵ects No No
Sample Opioid overdoses All overdoses
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2015,
2017), BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006). This table shows
the association between Naloxone access and tra c accident-related mortality with
demographic controls. Column 1 presents the results with the outcome variable as
tra c accident deaths per 10,000 in the opioid overdoses sample. Column 2 presents
the results with the outcome variable as tra c accident deaths per 10,000 in the all
overdoses sample.
45
Table 10: E↵ect of Naloxone access on tra c accident deaths
(1) (2)
Had Naloxone access -0.008 -0.008
(0.021) (0.021)
Social Capital index 0.094⇤ 0.094⇤
(0.052) (0.052)




Unemployment rate -6.108⇤⇤⇤ -6.108⇤⇤⇤
(0.728) (0.728)
Percent with health insurance -5.118⇤⇤⇤ -5.118⇤⇤⇤
(0.832) (0.832)
Percent with income below the poverty line 1.654⇤⇤⇤ 1.654⇤⇤⇤
(0.626) (0.626)
US county prescribing rate per 100 persons -0.001⇤ -0.001⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Percent with college degree -5.039⇤⇤⇤ -5.039⇤⇤⇤
(0.454) (0.454)
Urban county -0.889⇤⇤⇤ -0.889⇤⇤⇤
(0.076) (0.076)
Median age 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008)












Mean dependent variable 1.891 1.891
Observations 5814 5814
R-Squared 0.030 0.030
County Fixed E↵ects No No
Sample Opioid overdoses All overdoses
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2015, 2017),
BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006). This table shows the association
between Naloxone access and tra c accident-related mortality with demographic controls.
Column 1 presents the results with the outcome variable as tra c accident deaths per
10,000 in the opioid overdoses sample. Column 2 presents the results with the outcome
variable as tra c accident deaths per 10,000 in the all overdoses sample.
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Table 11: E↵ect of Naloxone access on tra c accident deaths
(1) (2)
Had Naloxone access -0.023 -0.023
(0.024) (0.024)
Social Capital index 0.102⇤ 0.102⇤
(0.052) (0.052)
Naloxone access ⇥ Social capital -0.029 -0.029
(0.023) (0.023)




Unemployment rate -6.111⇤⇤⇤ -6.111⇤⇤⇤
(0.728) (0.728)
Percent with health insurance -5.125⇤⇤⇤ -5.125⇤⇤⇤
(0.831) (0.831)
Percent with income below the poverty line 1.655⇤⇤⇤ 1.655⇤⇤⇤
(0.626) (0.626)
US county prescribing rate per 100 persons -0.001⇤ -0.001⇤
(0.001) (0.001)
Percent with college degree -5.033⇤⇤⇤ -5.033⇤⇤⇤
(0.454) (0.454)
Urban county -0.889⇤⇤⇤ -0.889⇤⇤⇤
(0.076) (0.076)
Median age 0.040⇤⇤⇤ 0.040⇤⇤⇤
(0.008) (0.008)












Mean dependent variable 1.891 1.891
Observations 5814 5814
R-Squared 0.031 0.031
County Fixed E↵ects No No
Sample Opioid overdoses All overdoses
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. Data sources: CDC (yearly,
2011-2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016), ACS (2015, 2017), BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006).
This table shows the association between Naloxone access and traffic accident-related mortality with demographic
controls and an interaction term. Column 1 presents the results with the outcome variable as traffic accident deaths
per 10,000 in the opioid overdoses sample. Column 2 presents the results with the outcome variable as traffic accident
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Counties with available opioid death rate data.
Source: CDC
Figure 10: Opioid-related deaths vs. transport accident deaths
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Table 12: Replication of main regressions on overdose counties
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Had Naloxone access -0.049 -0.010 -0.017 -0.043
(0.079) (0.061) (0.061) (0.056)
2012 -0.033 -0.030 -0.032 -0.030
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042)
2013 -0.107⇤⇤ -0.082⇤ -0.092⇤⇤ -0.089⇤
(0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
2014 -0.117⇤ -0.072 -0.084 -0.084
(0.065) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068)
2015 -0.017 0.020 0.011 0.014
(0.048) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
2016 -0.016 0.020 0.014 0.007
(0.098) (0.085) (0.084) (0.086)
Social Capital index -0.270⇤⇤⇤ -0.254⇤⇤⇤
(0.087) (0.088)
Naloxone access ⇥ Social capital -0.038
(0.037)
Mean dependent variable 1.229 1.229 1.229 1.229
Observations 306 306 306 306
R-Squared 0.124 0.187 0.184 0.193
County Fixed E↵ects Yes No No No
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01. Robust standard errors are shown in paren-
theses. Data sources: CDC (yearly, 2011-2016), PDAPS (yearly, 2011-2016),
ACS (2015, 2017), BLS (yearly, 2011-2016) and Rupasingha et al. (2006).
Columns 1-4 present the results of regressions 1-4 on the counties included
in the overdose sample but not in the opioid overdose sample. The outcome
variable is deaths per 10,000 in a county due to overdoses.
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